


SECRET

PROSPECTS FOR INCREASED PROTECTION OF INTELLIGENCE,  
SOURCES AND METHODS, THROUGH IMPLEMENTATION OF  
DCID NO. 1/14, DATED 23 JUNE 1967

1. BACKGROUND

- A. THE NEED FOR UNIFORMITY IN THE PERSONNEL SECURITY CRITERIA FOR ACCESS TO COMPARTMENTED INTELLIGENCE WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY PFIAB ITSELF IN ITS STUDY OF THE DUNLAP CASE IN 1964 AND WAS ASSIGNED TO THE USIB SECURITY COMMITTEE FOR ACTION.
- B. THE DISCOVERY IN 1965 OF THE ESPIONAGE ACTIVITY OF SGT. ROBERT L. JOHNSON, ESPECIALLY WHILE HE WAS ASSIGNED TO THE ARMED FORCES COURIER SERVICE (ARFCOS) SERVED TO RE-EMPHASIZE THE NEED FOR UNIFORMITY IN THIS FIELD.
- C. AFTER CONSIDERABLE INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION AS WELL AS CONSULTATION WITH OTHER USIB COMMITTEES (SIGINT - COMOR) THE DCID WAS ISSUED IN 1967.



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2. SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

- A. THE DCID ESTABLISHES UNIFORM PERSONNEL SECURITY APPROVAL CRITERIA INCLUDING THE SCOPE OF THE INVESTIGATION, FOR ACCESS TO ALL THE COMMUNITY'S COMPARTMENTED COLLECTION SYSTEMS (EXCEPT RESTRICTED DATA WHICH HAS STATUTORY CONTROL).
- B. THESE SYSTEMS REPRESENT OUR MOST SENSITIVE, MOST PRODUCTIVE AND MOST EXPENSIVE COLLECTION EFFORTS.
- C. THE NUMBER OF PERSONS WITH THESE CLEARANCES WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IS STAGGERING:

SI:

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

TKH AND [REDACTED] APPROXIMATELY [REDACTED]

3. IMPACT OF DCID 1/14 ON THE COMMUNITY

- A. ESTABLISHES, FOR THE FIRST TIME, COMMON PERSONNEL SECURITY CRITERIA AND UNIFORM INVESTIGATIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR ALL SYSTEMS.
- B. WILL FACILITATE SECURITY CERTIFICATIONS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY.
- C. STRESSES THAT A SECURITY APPROVAL MUST BE A COMMON SENSE DETERMINATION BASED ON ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION.

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- D. CONTINGENT UPON "NEED-TO-KNOW," A PERSON CLEARED FOR ONE SYSTEM CAN NOW EASILY BE PROCESSED FOR ACCESS TO ANOTHER SYSTEM, SINCE THE STANDARDS ARE UNIFORM.
- E. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A PERIODIC (5-YEAR) RE-INVESTIGATION IS A VALUABLE CI TOOL.
- F. AS A SIDE EFFECT, THE USIB APPROVED RECOMMENDATION THAT ALL PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO ARFCOS MEET DCID 1/14 STANDARDS, WILL BOTH UP-GRADE ARFCOS SECURITY AND AT THE SAME TIME, PROVIDE GREATER SECURITY FOR THE COMMUNITY'S INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENTS CARRIED THROUGH ARFCOS CHANNELS.

4. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

- A. WITH DCID 1/14 ESTABLISHING A PRECEDENT, WE MAY EXPECT SOME PROGRESS TOWARD UNIFORMITY IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS:
  - 1) THE PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT (PHS):  
A WORKING GROUP HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED TO EXPLORE THE FEASIBILITY OF DEVELOPING A COMMON PHS FOR THE COMMUNITY.

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- 2) **PHYSICAL SECURITY STANDARDS (MONEY IS A PERENNIAL PROBLEM IN THIS FIELD, BUT A START HAS BEEN MADE IN THE ACCEPTANCE OF A COMMON FORMAT FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY SURVEYS).**
- 3) **WITH THE EVER GROWING SOPHISTICATION OF COLLECTION METHODS, AND THE ACADEMIC BACKGROUND OF THOSE INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY INVOLVED IN THESE PROGRAMS, SECURITY REVIEW PROCEDURES FOR ARTICLES, SPEECHES AND PARTICIPATION IN SEMINARS ARE MOST IMPORTANT. TO ATTAIN MORE UNIFORMITY IN THIS FIELD, A WORKING GROUP HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED TO REVIEW THE SECURITY REVIEW PROCEDURES OF MEMBER AGENCIES TO ENSURE UNIFORMITY.**

5. **A SECURITY PROBLEM: NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY**

A. **THE ERVIN BILL (S-1035)**

**A BILL TO PROTECT EMPLOYEES OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT:**

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- (1) TO ENJOY THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
- (2) TO PREVENT UNWARRANTED GOVERNMENTAL  
INVASION OF PRIVACY

**B. STATUS**

PASSED BY SENATE ON 13 SEPTEMBER 1967 BY AN OVER-  
WHELMING MAJORITY. INTRODUCED INTO THE HOUSE AND  
NOW IN COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE.

**C. SALIENT POINTS IN BRIEF - PROHIBITIONS**

- (1) TO DISCLOSE RACE, RELIGION OR NATIONAL ORIGIN  
OR THAT OF FOREBEARS. (INQUIRY CAN BE MADE  
WHEN DEEMED NECESSARY OR ADVISABLE TO  
DETERMINE SUITABILITY FOR ASSIGNMENT RELATED  
TO NATIONAL SECURITY WITHIN OR OUTSIDE U.S.).
- (2) TO MAKE ANY REPORT CONCERNING HIS ACTIVITIES  
OR UNDERTAKINGS UNLESS SUCH ARE RELATED TO  
PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTIES. (DOES NOT  
PRECLUDE IF THERE IS BELIEF OF OUTSIDE ACTIVITIES  
OR EMPLOYMENT IS IN CONFLICT WITH OFFICIAL  
DUTIES).

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- (3) TO SUBMIT TO INTERROGATION (WHERE INVESTIGATION IS FOR MISCONDUCT) WHICH COULD LEAD TO DISCIPLINARY ACTION WITHOUT PRESENCE OF COUNSEL OR PERSON OF CHOICE, IF REQUESTED.
- (4) TO DISCLOSE ANY ITEMS OF PROPERTY, INCOME, ETC. OR THOSE OF ANY MEMBER OF FAMILY UNLESS CONFLICT OF INTEREST IS INVOLVED.
- (5) TO SUBMIT TO ANY INTERROGATION OR EXAMINATION OR TAKE ANY PSYCHOLOGICAL TEST DESIGNED TO ELICIT INFORMATION (WITH ANY PERSON CONNECTED BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE, RELIGIOUS BELIEFS OR PRACTICES, ATTITUDE OR CONDUCT RE SEXUAL MATTERS). DOES NOT PRECLUDE SPECIFIC SEXUAL MISCONDUCT CHARGES MADE AGAINST THAT PERSON FOR WHICH AN OPPORTUNITY IS AFFORDED TO REFUTE CHARGE.
- (6) TO TAKE A POLYGRAPH TEST IN APPLYING FOR EMPLOYMENT DESIGNED TO ELICIT INFO AS GIVEN ABOVE.

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- (7) TO REQUIRE PARTICIPATION IN ANY ACTIVITIES  
OR UNDERTAKINGS UNLESS RELATED TO OFFICIAL  
DUTIES.

**D. IMPACT OF BILL ON SENSITIVE AGENCIES**

- (1) LIMITS QUESTIONS INVOLVING NATIONAL ORIGIN OF  
APPLICANT, PARENTS, SPOUSE AND RELATIVES BY  
MARRIAGE, BLOOD OR ADOPTION. ESSENTIAL IN  
PROTECTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY.
- (2) LIMITS INQUIRIES ON OUTSIDE ACTIVITIES - SUB-  
VERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS, FRONT ORGANIZATIONS,  
PRIVATE FOREIGN TRAVEL, UNOFFICIAL CONTACTS IN  
U. S. WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE USSR, ITS  
SATELLITES, OR COUNTRIES UNDER COMMUNIST  
CONTROL.
- (3) PRECLUDES PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENTS FOR  
SENSITIVE ASSIGNMENTS AND RELATED MATTERS.
- (4) PRECLUDES THE USE OF THE POLYGRAPH AS AN AID  
TO INVESTIGATIONS.
- (5) LIMITS THE USE OF AN EFFECTIVE PERSONAL HISTORY  
STATEMENT.

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- (6) ADVERSE EFFECT ON FIELD INVESTIGATIONS.
- (7) SOME LIMITATIONS ON INTERROGATIONS FOR MIS-  
CONDUCT WHICH MAY INVOLVE NATIONAL SECURITY.

### E. EXCEPTIONS

FBI, CIA AND NSA - DOES NOT PRECLUDE THESE AGENCIES FROM REQUESTING AN EMPLOYEE OR APPLICANT TO TAKE A POLYGRAPH TEST OR A PSYCHOLOGICAL TEST WHEN SUCH TEST OR INFORMATION IS REQUIRED TO PROTECT THE NATIONAL SECURITY.

OTHER MEMBERS OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY NOT EXCEPTED. THEY RECEIVE THE MOST SENSITIVE INFORMATION FROM CIA.

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